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Behavioral adaptation and cognitive control are crucial for goal-reaching behaviors. Every
creature is ubiquitously faced with choices between behavioral alternatives. Common
sense suggests that errors are an important source of information in the regulation of
such processes. Several theories exist regarding cognitive control and the processing of
undesired outcomes. However, most of these models focus on the consequences of an
error, and less attention has been paid to the mechanisms that underlie the commissioning
of an error. In this article, we present an integrative review of neuro-cognitive models
that detail the determinants of the occurrence of response errors. The factors that
may determine the likelihood of committing errors are likely related to the stability
of task-representations in prefrontal networks, attentional selection mechanisms and
mechanisms of action selection in basal ganglia circuits. An important conclusion is that
the likelihood of committing an error is not stable over time but rather changes depending
on the interplay of different functional neuro-anatomical and neuro-biological systems.
We describe factors that might determine the time-course of cognitive control and the
need to adapt behavior following response errors. Finally, we outline the mechanisms that
may proof useful for predicting the outcomes of cognitive control and the emergence of
response errors in future research.
Keywords: action selection, performance monitoring, basal ganglia, dopamine function, dual-process theory of
dopamine function, biased competition, error processing, dopamine
INTRODUCTION
Errare humanum est, sed in errare perseverare diabolicum
(Seneca). In other words: “who commits an error and does
not correct it, commits a second one” (Confucius). Similar
notions can be found in texts by Seneca, Horaz, Cicero and
Aristotle. Already these philosophical notions stipulate the rel-
evance and importance of the detection and compensation of
errors. However, obviously there exist several types of errors.
Basically, one can commit “mistakes” (e.g., not knowing the cor-
rect decision) or “slips” (the selected action is not what has been
intended). The latter is what is this manuscript is about: a situ-
ation leading to an inappropriate action selection, likely making
you think: “Upps.”
We constantly evaluate our own actions, and such evaluations
are important for goal-directed behavior. This type of evaluation
marks the endpoint of the solving of one of the main prob-
lems every creature is constantly confronted with: the choice
between behavioral alternatives or between competing systems
that seek simultaneous access to a restricted resource (Mink, 1996;
Redgrave et al., 1999). Action selection is clearly error prone,
meaning that we do not always select the appropriate action in
a given situation. Rather, we must use these errors to adapt our
behavior to changes in environmental demands. This process
requires constant monitoring, evaluation and adaptation of one’s
own actions in accordance with environmental demands.
However, many research and theories (refer Boxes 1, 2) focus
on the processes and modulators of processes that follow an
error, or its consequences from a more cognitive or computa-
tional perspective, but do not address the processes that precede
an error as well as detail possible neurobiological and func-
tional neuroanatomical aspects possibly important to understand
how errors are committed. Similarly, the research in the fields of
response control and error monitoring reviewed above is com-
mitted to identifying the determinants of error processing and
not the determinants of “error commissioning.” There are a few
noteworthy exceptions in literature, as the work by Ridderinkhof
et al. (2003) examining EEG correlates of processes occurring
before an error, or the work by Cavanagh et al. (2011, 2012) show-
ing that distinct neural oscillations in the theta frequency band
reflect processes of the fore-period of an error, or the work by
Weissman et al. (2006) pointing to the importance of attentional
processes in this regard. “Error commissioning,” though common
to everybody as a phenomenon of importance in daily life, is still
not in the focus of the cognitive neuroscience community, espe-
cially if compared to the vast amount of research conducted in the
last decades on the consequences of an error and their neuronal
mechanisms. Therefore, in the current review we will outline
what theoretical concepts may be important to consider when try-
ing to examine the mechanisms determining the commission of
errors.
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Box 1 | Theories of error processing.
Historically, the “mismatch hypothesis” is an early hypothesis that assumes that the neural representations of initiated and demanded
(re-)actions are compared, which means that the error signal (reflected in the Ne/ERN) reflects a process that compares the output of
the motor system (i.e., an efference copy) with the plan of the response (Falkenstein et al., 1990; Gehring et al., 1993; Scheffers et al.,
1996). However, today the most influential models seem to be: (i) the conflict model, (ii) the reinforcement learning (RFL) hypothesis, and
possibly (iii) the predicted-response outcome (PRO) model.
The conflict monitoring theory (Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick et al., 2001; van Veen and Carter, 2002) assumes that in all situations in which
two or more actions can be performed, a conflict between these response options emerges. The term conflict refers to a temporal overlap
of (pre-) activated response sets. This conflict signals the need to increase control. Errors (at least fast guesses) emerge from conflicts of
nearly simultaneously established response representations wherein the erroneous response is nearly automatically activated (e.g., Yeung
et al., 2004). However, conflict can even exist at the attentional and stimulus-processing levels, at least in situations that require efficient
perceptual processing.
The reinforcement learning hypothesis (RFL; Holroyd and Coles, 2002) assumes that error signals are carried by the mesencephalic
dopamine system and are used to train the ACC to optimize performance on the task at hand. In this theory, the ACC acts as a motor
control filter that decides which motor commands are issued to the motor system. The theory of Holroyd and Coles (2002) details how an
error signal is generated by the ACC and is based on the notion that the major mechanism by which errors are detected relies upon the
temporal difference model (TD-model) of dopamine function (Suri and Schultz, 1998, 2001; for review see Suri, 2002). The RFL is not at
odds with conflict theory. Holroyd et al. (2005) suggested integration of the conflict model and RFL.
The third model is the predicted-response outcome (PRO) model (Alexander and Brown, 2011). This model focuses on the functional
role of the medial PFC, or more specifically, the ACC, with respect to errors, error likelihood, conflict, reward valence, and punishment.
This model is a probabilistic model of the medial PFC. It assumes that the medial PFC is mainly involved in learning and predicting the
outcome of actions, regardless of the motivational saliency. The model assumes that during the time course of an experiment, the ACC
learns a timed prediction of the possible responses that are related to a stimulus and the corresponding outcomes. The signal from which
this relationship is learned consists of integration of response-outcome combinations, i.e., prediction errors, which consist of unexpected
outcomes and unexpected non-occurrences (cf. Alexander and Brown, 2011). The PRO model suggests the mPFC to be not only the key
region with respect to cognitive control, but also that the mPFC is concerned with and establishing predictions with respect to actions in
general.
However, it needs to be noted that all of these models assume that individual become more accurate after an error, an effect that is related
to the post-error slowing effect (i.e., a reduction in the speed of responding after an error). However, several lines of evidence suggest that
these effects only occur when error are infrequent (Notebaert et al., 2009) and is also modulated by the instruction (i.e., focus on accuracy
vs. speed, Jentzsch and Leuthold, 2005) as well as if the task is self-paced (Steinborn et al., 2012).
Box 2 | Properties of the error processing signal.
In the electroencephalogram (EEG), an error is reflected by a negative deflection (at approximately 60ms) at fronto-central electrode
positions. This deflection is known as the error negativity (Ne, Falkenstein et al., 1990) or error-related negativity (ERN, Gehring et al.,
1993). However, even following correct responses, a similar negativity (correct-response negativity, CRN) can be observed (Vidal et al.,
2000, 2003; Hoffmann and Falkenstein, 2010). Some evidence exists that suggests that the CRN and Ne/ERN are reflections of the same
neural system (Hoffmann and Falkenstein, 2010; Roger et al., 2010) that is central to the adaptation of actions. The modality does not
modulate the ERN (e.g., Masaki et al., 2001; Endrass et al., 2005) or CRN (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Forster and Pavone, 2008) and the
occurrence is not restricted to choice reaction tasks (Falkenstein et al., 1995; Gehring et al., 1995; Gehring andWilloughby, 2002; Hoffmann
and Falkenstein, 2011, 2012; Hoffmann and Wascher, 2012).
Several studies have demonstrated the involvement of the rostral cingulate cortex (rACC; Kiehl et al., 2000; Mathalon et al., 2003; Klein
et al., 2007a) and the pre-supplemental motor area (pre-SMA; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Specifically, the importance of the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) has been supported by several findings based on functional imaging. An error-related blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) signal increase in the ACC has been found (Menon et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2007) and has been shown
to be predictive of the strength of the Ne/ERN measured via EEG (Dehaene et al., 1994; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2001; Debener
et al., 2005; Willemssen et al., 2011; Beste et al., 2012b; Hoffmann et al., 2014). The importance of the ACC for error processing is also
corroborated by single-unit recordings in rodents (Stuphorn et al., 2000; Emeric et al., 2010) and lesion studies (Swick and Turken, 2002). In
addition to the ACC, the anterior insular cortex (AIC) has been demonstrated to be involved in error processing (Ullsperger and von Cramon,
2003; Hester et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2007a; Ullsperger et al., 2010). However, aside these neocortical structures also the basal ganglia
play an important role (Falkenstein et al., 2001; Beste et al., 2006, 2009; Ito and Kitagawa, 2006; Beste et al., 2007, 2008; Willemssen
et al., 2008). The importance of the basal ganglia for error monitoring and error-related behavioral adaptation may at least partly relate to the
importance of the dopaminergic for error processing (refer Box 1), which is suggested by several studies on psychiatric diseases affecting
the dopamine system (Mathalon et al., 2002; Ridderinkhof et al., 2002; Holroyd and Yeung, 2003; Easdon et al., 2005; Liotti et al., 2005),
and foremost by neuropharmacological studies (e.g., Zirnheld et al., 2004; de Bruijn et al., 2006; Willemssen et al., 2009) and neurogenetic
studies (Frank et al., 2007; Klein et al., 2007b; Krämer et al., 2007). However because the dopaminergic system strongly interacts with
other neurotransmitter systems, the monitoring of errors is also modulated by those neurotransmitter systems (Tieges et al., 2004; Baune
et al., 2010; Beste et al., 2010a,b,c, 2011a, 2013). For a detailed review of the neurobiological factors (i.e., neurotransmitter systems) that
influence performance monitoring processes, see Jocham and Ullsperger (2009).
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 50 | 2
Hoffmann and Beste Mechanisms of error commissioning
“Error commissioning” may be defined as misguided
action/response selection, i.e., a failure in the multitude of selec-
tion processes that occur prior to a motor response. However,
besides these top–down mechanisms, also other factors related
to the bottom–up processing of stimuli need to be considered.
Starting from a simple example we will outline which com-
ponents of different theoretical conceptions may be useful to
derive future formal models of error commission. The review will
conclude with a perspective on the venues of future research and
approaches that may be combined to approach the mechanisms
underlying error commissions.
A COGNITIVE VIEW ON ERROR COMMISSION
Before outlining the possible neurophysiological mechanisms that
are probably important to consider when one is interested in
the neural mechanisms underlying the commission of errors, the
question of how the involved constructs, such as decisions, action
selection and erroneous and correct information processing can
be quantified to relate these contracts to the described neuro-
physiological mechanisms arises. In a wider sense, the described
mechanisms, i.e., information processing or action selection, can
be defined as the processes that are involved in decision making.
In the field of cognitive psychology, a vast literature on well-
established models related to this topic exists. Thus, a review in
this regard will always be selective. However, it is helpful, to start
with a how errors emerge from a cognitive perspective.
Basically, errors might emerge due to deficient knowledge
(i.e., mistakes); but also due to deficient vigilant attention (for a
detailed review cf. Langner and Eickhoff, 2013), due to inappro-
priate stimulus processing, or due to deficient response selection,
i.e., response conflict. Another view is that there are basically two
error types: impulsive errors (i.e., slips, fast guessing), and errors
due to cognitive overload (Reason, 1990). Thus, in experimental
designs, errors are due to quite different manipulations. It would
go far beyond the scope of the present review to present ALL pos-
sibilities in this regard. However, a key factor that provokes errors
is task difficulty, which is closely related to cognitive efficiency
such that performance in a task at hand is a function of speed
and accuracy, or speed accuracy trade-off (SAT). Indeed, error-
likelihood does not vary only on a purely random way. Already
Rabbitt (1966) found that subjects adjust their strategy immedi-
ately following errors in order to adapt on a behavioral level. Later,
it was found that subjects set up response criteria a priori in order
to adapt their response strategy with respect to task difficulty (this
was termed Macro-SAT), but they also adapt on a single-trial
level due to carry over effects of one trial to another (i.e., Micro-
SAT; Jentzsch and Leuthold, 2005; Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009).
Furthermore, subjects can proactively adjust their strategy, i.e.,
response threshold in order to prevent errors (Brown and Braver,
2005) if a valid cue is provided to the participants.
Coming back to the different types of errors, it has to be stip-
ulated, that in the present review we focus on errors due to fast
guesses or impulsive errors due to e.g., misallocation of attention.
Indeed, the mechanisms described herein might be quite different
in other error types due to the involved cognitive mechanisms.
Already Gehring et al. (1993) suggested that impulsive errors
induce post-error slowing which is completely different in errors
due to cognitive overload: here, there is no post-error slowing
observable (Hochman andMeiran, 2005). Going more into detail
with respect to the causes of errors, it was found that obviously
distracting or even aversive information might play a crucial role:
e.g., auditory noise affects errors rate considerably (Steinborn and
Langner, 2011). Another point is, that the number of alternative
responses is closely related to error probability (Hick, 1952). This
is due to the fact, that guessing in a situation with many response
alternatives is not quite a good idea, since almost any lapse of
attention or slip will result in an error because the basic proba-
bility of being correct by guessing is quite low in this situation.
Highly relevant in the context of the present review is that the key
correlate of response, or error monitoring is correlated with the
number of response alternatives (Maier et al., 2010) indicating
that increasing the number of response alternative decreases or
negatively affects response monitoring mechanisms. This might
well play a role with respect to adaptive strategies throughout the
experiment and thus error commission.
But how can onemodel the processes involved in stimulus pro-
cessing and response selection? One model, the dual-stage model
(DSTP; Hübner et al., 2010) assumes two phases (an early and a
late phase) of response selection (Hübner et al., 2010). During the
first phase, stimulus information affects the categorical selection
and response selection processes, and during the second phase,
response selection is driven by categorical selection. However,
an open debate exists (e.g., White et al., 2011) with respect to
the question whether this model can be generalized, since it was
derived from a flanker task. Anyway, different error types induce
different strategies and thus likely different neural structures or
functions are involved. This is also important in the context of the
cognitive model with respect to binary decision we focus on in the
following. What is interesting in this model is that it might not
only be capable to model both errors types, it is also appealing,
since it can be linked to neural models as well.
In the cognitive modeling of decision-making, it is assumed
that evidence related to stimulus processing is accumulated via
a stochastic, noisy process until a decision criterion is reached
(e.g., Ratcliff, 2013). The drift diffusion model (DDM, Ratcliff,
1978) decomposes reaction time distributions and error rates into
several parameters. Basically, the DDM assumes an accumulation
of information during the performance of a binary choice. This
information accumulation is described as a stochastic process that
drifts into different decisional outcomes, for example left or right,
or, in the context of the present manuscript, correct or incorrect
choices (see Figure 1).
The four basic parameters of the DDM (Figure 1) are the
drift rate (v), boundary or threshold separation (a), starting
point (z), and the duration of the non-decisional process (T0).
In terms of cognitive psychology, the drift rate represents the
speed of information accumulation or the speed of informa-
tion processing. Thus, the drift rate is a performance measure
that reflects, for example, the difficulty of the task. Smaller
drift rates are associated with more difficult tasks. The bound-
ary separation (a) describes how much information is needed
for a decision. Large values indicate rather conservative deci-
sion strategies, and small values indicate rather liberal decision
strategies. Indeed, the boundary separation is sensitive to speed
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the diffusion process of a
single decision between two response alternatives A and B. The curved
line represents the accumulation of information over time until boundary
separation (a) is reached, which is the time point of the decision for the
corresponding response. The reaction time is therefore a function of the
boundary separation, the speed of information processing (as reflected by
the steepness of z), the non-decisional time T0 (which reflects basic
stimulus processing) and the starting point (z) (which refers to how
conservative or liberal the subject is with respect to error commissioning or
to one of the two response alternatives).
and accuracy instructions (Voss et al., 2004). The starting point
(z) describes the a priori bias associated with one of the choices.
Such a bias could arise if, for example, one of the responses
is associated with a larger reward than the other (Voss et al.,
2004). Moreover, trait-like biases can influence the starting point;
e.g., obsessive–compulsive disorder patients tend to increase
their response monitoring, as indicated by the ERN (Endrass
et al., 2008; Hajcak et al., 2008; Endrass et al., 2010; Mathews
et al., 2012). The fourth parameter, i.e., the duration of non-
decisional processes, quantifies processes such as basic encoding
processes and/or the process of response execution (more specif-
ically, motor activity). In summary, these parameters are closely
related to the question of how the time course and cognitive pro-
cesses involved in error commissioning can be quantified and
predicted.
A NEURO-COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE OF ERROR
COMMISSIONING
Let’s first consider an example to describe and to integrate how
different existing theoretical conceptions may be combined to
understand the mechanisms that lead to error commissioning.
After this description, we will examine the evidence and con-
ceptual grounds for a neuro-cognitive perspective in detail (refer
section A Neuro-cognitive Perspective of Error Commissioning).
Along the lines of this example, we will elucidate different con-
ceptions and the links between these conceptions to understand
the mechanisms of error commissioning and how these may
influence future formalized computational models of errors com-
mission. Goal of this integrative review is to provide an overview
of potential neurobiological and functional neuroanatomical fac-
tors that are possibly essential to consider when interested in the
neural mechanisms leading to an error. Therefore, we do not
intend to put forward a formalized computational model of error
commissioning.
Consider a typical situation that provokes response errors and
is characterized by discrepancies between a desired goal state and
the response that is actually executed. Figure 2 depicts a per-
spective about current cognitive and neurophysiological theories
about how action and behavioral adaptation are implemented.
It can be assumed that task-goal representations are stored
in the working memory in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and as
a copy that is likely transferred to the basal ganglia (BG) via
functional prefrontal BG loops (Chudasama and Robbins, 2006).
Due to this transfer, a representation of the task goal is also set
up in the BG, and sensory input is simultaneously provided to
the BG. These different inputs form a “map” of different neu-
ral activities that may vary in strength (Figure 1, Alternative B).
However, the selected action does not only depend on the neural
representations but also on those parameters of stimulus process-
ing (Lawrence et al., 2003) that are related to differences in the
saliency of stimuli.
Suppose there are two stimuli (A and B) that differ in saliency
and are related to opposing actions (A = correct; B = erro-
neous) that are attempting gain control over behavior. Due to
their different saliencies, these actions evoke correspondingly dif-
ferent degrees of activation in their competition with each other
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004;
Knudsen, 2007). Whether stimulus A wins this perceptual com-
petition depends on (i) the relative saliency of stimulus B and
(ii) the intentional biases (i.e., top-down influences) that favor
stimulus B and disfavor the processing of stimulus A (Knudsen,
2007). The net result of these perceptual competitive influences
determines whether feature A or B is detected and controls behav-
ior. If the net result favors the erroneous stimulus B, stimulus
A loses the competition, is not detected and will not govern
behavior (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). In addition to these
factors, other factors also influencing this net-result may be
related to top–down attentional biases, like previously learned
stimulus-response associations or bottom–up influences on these
association strength like spontaneous fluctuations and lapses in
the attentional system (which is of particular importance when
considering altered error processing/commission in diseases; e.g.,
Weissman et al., 2006; Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007; Sarter
and Paolone, 2011). Thus, this process may ultimately lead to
an error. We assume that the net result of these processes is also
fed into fronto-striatal loops. Within the basal ganglia, an action
selection mechanism operates using the principles of a “winner-
takes-all” network that converges to a single winner (Bar-Gad
et al., 2003). The most salient of the representations provided
by the PFC, sensory signals from the primary sensory areas and
efference copies of motor activity is selected. In the next step,
the winning representation is fed to the motor cortex, and the
response is executed. There are at least three possible constella-
tions by which a correct task-goal representation can compete
with other, error-favoring sensory inputs (Figure 1, Alternative
B). If the neural activation at the BG level caused by the correct
task representation is stronger than the other neural activations,
the correct task representation wins, and the correct response is
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 50 | 4
Hoffmann and Beste Mechanisms of error commissioning
FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the structure of the integrative review. (A) This
figure illustrates the functional components of error processing and includes
information about their relative relevance in the error monitoring process over
time and their corresponding theoretical links. At the left of the figure, the
different theoretical conceptions are outlined. Each of these theories refers to
either one specific or various functional neuroanatomical levels and
processes in error commissioning that are described in section A Cognitiv‘e
View on Error Commission. The red lines denote feedback loops that mediate
post-error neural mechanisms. (B) Illustration of the relative strength/stability
of prefrontal representations and distractor saliency at the basal ganglia level.
The maps indicate the strength/stability of the task goal representation in the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) as well as the saliency of a (distractor) stimulus at the
perceptual/attentional level. As outlined in the text, it is assumed that both
the stability of the PFC representations and the saliency of (distracting)
stimuli are commonly represented in fronto-striatal networks. The heights of
the respective “blobs” in the activation map are important. In the leftmost
part of the figure, distractor information is likely to be canceled out because
the stability of the prefrontal representation is high. In the right-most part of
the figure, the distractor is highly salient and therefore likely leads to
overwriting of the task-goal representation. Note that the figure is only an
illustration of the core components described in the review; the underlying
computations have only the function to stipulate the main points.
likely to be executed. In the opposite case of a dominant irrele-
vant sensory input, an erroneous response is the most likely to
be provoked. However, if the activations of task representation
and the sensory input are equivalent, the motor response may be
selected almost randomly via a stochastic process (e.g., consider
a situation in which one is uncertain about the correct response)
or even activate conflicting motor responses. However, task pro-
cessing does not end with the initiation of response execution
because inadequate task handling (irrespective of being erroneous
or unexpected) requires controlled adaptation. This control and
the corresponding structures (i.e., the ACC and PFC) are the next
important functional stations in this framework that should be
considered. Once the response is executed, a novel action can,
in principal, be executed immediately. However, if the previous
response was erroneous, this processing sequence is not ade-
quate. To adapt behavior, the previously described process can
begin again but has to wait for the outcome of an evaluation
that provides information about the adequacy/correctness of the
executed response. At this point, the above-mentioned neuro-
cognitive perspective on error commissioning connects with the
established error processing models that focus on the conse-
quences of an error and how those consequences are used to adapt
behavior.
An important aspect of the above neuro-cognitive conception
of error commissioning is that the likelihood of committing an
error is not stable over time. Rather, the fluctuations in error like-
lihood are grounded in the processes discussed above. We assume
that each of the above-described factors reveals a specific pro-
cessing pattern over time. For prefrontal processes, this pattern
is related to fluctuations in the stability of task-goal representa-
tions that might emerge because in prefrontal networks stability
of information is not stable, but fluctuates.Moreover, fluctuations
in the saliency of error-favoring sensory input emerge due to the
ability to suppress this erroneous input and the relative salien-
cies of relevant and irrelevant (i.e., error-favoring) inputs. The
interplay of each of these factors then determines the resulting
error likelihood. This interplay likely depends on different neu-
robiological factors and their temporal properties. Fluctuations
in error likelihood are therefore not only determined by the
strengths of representations in the prefrontal networks. Rather,
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fluctuations in error likelihood are also influenced bymechanisms
related to attentional selection and vigilance that are associated
with the perceptual processing of stimuli. However, the precise
contribution of each of these processes might vary considerably.
To provide a simple illustration of error likelihood, only the influ-
ences of the strength of the task representation in the PFC and
the saliency of the error-favoring stimulus input are depicted in
Figure 1, Alternative B. The left image in Figure 1, Alternative
B represents a putative case of low error likelihood at the time
point of action selection. In this case, the strength of the pre-
frontal representation is considered to be high, and the saliency
of error-favoring stimuli is considered to be low. The resulting
error likelihood emerges by combining both factors. However,
error likelihood can increase (Figure 1, Alternative B, middle and
right); for example, if low-stability task representations coincide
with a high-saliency error-favoring sensory input at the time of
action selection, a high likelihood of error will result. Indeed, the
error likelihood at the time of action selection can remain at a
fairly low level for some period of time and can also remain at a
fairly high level for some period of time. Obviously, the durations
of the time periods in which the fluctuation of the error likelihood
is low depend on the strength of the task-goal representation and
the saliency of the error-favoring sensory input.
DETAILS ON THE NEURO-COGNITIVE BASIS OF
ERROR-COMMISSIONING
Having described factors that may play a role in error com-
missioning, several established conceptions appear to play roles
in a comprehensive account leading to an understanding of the
principles resulting in response errors. The processes described
above can be understood in terms of the core ideas of reinforce-
ment learning theory (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) and conceptions
proposing that the basal ganglia play an important role in action
selection (e.g., Bar-Gad et al., 2003; Gurney et al., 2004b; Maia
and Frank, 2011). Moreover, assumptions of the dual-state theory
of dopamine function (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Durstewitz and
Seamans, 2008) and the guided activation theory (Miller, 2000;
Miller and Cohen, 2001) seem to be important when trying to
examine the mechanisms that lead to an error, i.e., the investi-
gation of error commissioning. This is because these theories deal
with questions how representations stored in prefrontal networks
are maintained and used to guide action selection. Obviously,
these are important to consider the processes that lead to an error.
In particular, in tasks that require continuous and rapid process-
ing of stimuli, errors emerge due to attentional lapses or even con-
flicts in stimulus processing. Thus, aspects of attentional selection
processes also have to be considered. In this regard the “biased
competition model” of attention (Desimone and Duncan, 1995)
may provide useful grounds. However, the investigation of the
processing of information and action selection (or decision) from
a neurophysiological perspective should not ignore the heuris-
tic value of the existing well-established cognitive approaches
because these provide a solid theoretical basis regarding how
information is processed and how errors might emerge. Thus,
it appears at hand to combine different theoretical approaches
within the field of neuroscience, with established psychological
models such as the “drift diffusion model” (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978,
1979, 1980, 2006; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998; Vandekerckhove and
Tuerlinckx, 2007; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008) to approach the
question how errors are committed. In the forthcoming we detail
what how these factors may influence error commissioning and
what aspect are necessary to consider in future computational
models on error commissioning.
From prefrontal networks to attentional selection
Central to the above-suggested integration of different concepts
are assumptions about the stability of information in the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC). In nearly every daily situation people have a
goal that they try to fulfill. Often, this goal is the establishment
of proper stimulus-response mappings in terms of the defined
task at hand; e.g., “Respond with the left hand when stimulus
X is present, and respond with the right hand when stimulus Y
is present.” Such task-goal representations are stored in work-
ing memory buffers within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (e.g.,
Jonides et al., 2008). The most established assumption about
the function of the PFC networks is that they hold and manip-
ulate information (task-goal representations) for future use via
persistent activity states (e.g., Seamans and Yang, 2004). Within
the PFC, dopamine (DA) influx may serve as a gating signal
that instructs the network when to maintain a given activity
state (Miller, 2000). The neuromodulatory effects of dopamine
may strengthen current representations and protect them against
interference due to disruption by irrelevant distracting infor-
mation (Miller, 2000). According to the “dual-state theory of
dopamine function,” whether new information can easily access
working memory buffers (state 1) or current representations are
maintained and stabilized within prefrontal networks (state 2;
Seamans and Yang, 2004; Durstewitz and Seamans, 2008) appears
to depend on the state of the dopaminergic system.
In the first state (state 1), D2-receptor-mediated neural trans-
mission predominates and allows multiple inputs to access work-
ing memory buffers. In contrast, the second state (state 2) is
dominated by D1-receptor-related neural transmission. In this
state, the working memory buffers are relatively closed, but infor-
mation held within these buffers is more stable and controls the
output of prefrontal networks (Miller, 2000; Seamans and Yang,
2004). It may be speculated that these different states serve dif-
ferent brain functions in relation to performance monitoring.
Recent evidence has shown that D2-receptor mediated neural
transmission, though less important in the prefrontal cortex, is
associated with exploitative learning that adjusts response times
as a function of positive and negative outcomes (Frank et al.,
2009), which suggests that D2-receptor-mediated neural trans-
mission is of particular importance for processes that are related
to error commission and monitoring. However, the D1 and D2
states fluctuate spontaneously and are organized in an antago-
nistic fashion. During phases in which the D1-state dominates,
D2-receptor-related neural transmission is less active, and vice
versa. In the mechanism that mediates the transitions between the
D1 and D2 states, it is assumed that GABAergic and NMDA pro-
cesses play important roles (Seamans and Yang, 2004; Durstewitz
and Seamans, 2008). It is assumed that increases in D1-receptor
activation initially augment the robustness of representations
within the PFC (Seamans and Yang, 2004). However, further
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increases above an optimal level reverse these effects and shift
the system away from robustness. This process leads to changes
in the mode of the cognitive processes occurring in the PFC. The
dual-state theory of the dopamine system is not the only approach
to assume the existence of dynamic gating of representations in
the PFC (Hazy et al., 2010; O’Reilly et al., 2010). As illustrated
in the work of Dayan (2008, 2007), several approaches on PFC
functioning involve switching between network states that either
process information according to a habit that is inflexible or more
goal-directed and rule-governed states that enable the flexible
processing of task goals. In this regard, the biophysical properties
of the PFC that determine the stability of information and other
models of prefrontal cortical functioning reflect the assumption
of fluctuating states and the stability of task goals in the PFC and,
hence, the essential basis of the assumption of differences in error
likelihood over time.
However, the above-described mechanisms related to task goal
representations in the PFC have important consequences for
information processing in other brain areas. This idea constitutes
the core of the “guided activation theory” (Miller, 2000; Miller
and Cohen, 2001). This theory proposes that representations of
task-specific rules stored in PFC networks form attentional tem-
plates and goals (see also: Wood and Grafman, 2003) that are
needed to enable goal-directed behavior (Miller, 2000). This task
information enables the PFC to control processing in other brain
systems and direct that processing toward task-relevant informa-
tion (Miller, 2000). The aggregate effect of these bias signals is
to guide the flow of neural activity along pathways that establish
the proper mappings between the inputs, internal states and out-
puts that are needed to (correctly) perform a given task (Miller
and Cohen, 2001). This control is particularly important when-
ever stimuli are ambiguous, i.e., when stimuli activate more than
one input representation (Miller and Cohen, 2001). From this
perspective, the constellation of PFC biases can be viewed as the
neural implementation of rules or goals depending on the target
of their biasing influences. If these “bias signals” affect sensory
modalities, this can affect the mechanisms of attentional control
and thereby affect another major factor that may influence error
commissioning: attentional selection processes.
Frontal regions, including the anterior cingulate (Cabeza and
Nyberg, 2000; Lawrence et al., 2003), the right frontal cortex
(middle and inferior frontal gyrus) and bilateral parietal regions
(i.e., inferior parietal cortex), play a role in maintaining and con-
trolling attention over time (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Coull,
1998). They are the source of the biasing influences on sen-
sory processing (Knudsen, 2007) that can reduce the saliency
of the error-favoring stimuli. To the extent that biasing influ-
ences on attention depend on representations in the prefrontal
networks (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Knudsen, 2007), these
mechanisms may also be affected by the fluctuations in prefrontal
networks described above. As an effect that these influences are
not always able to bias attentional selection toward desired task
goals, which will, in addition to influences related to the rela-
tive saliency of error-leading stimuli, determine error likelihood.
The “biased competition theory of attention” (Knudsen, 2007;
Desimone and Duncan, 1995) assumes that the outcome of per-
ceptual competition is determined by the saliency of the stimuli
(Beste et al., 2011b, 2012a; Beste and Dinse, 2013) and intentional
biases (top-down influences). The net result of these percep-
tual competitive influences determines whether feature A or B
is detected and controls behavior (Sänger and Wascher, 2011;
Labrenz et al., 2012). When the net result favors the erroneous
stimulus B, stimulus A loses the competition, is not detected and
does not govern behavior (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), which
may ultimately lead to an error. Thus, fluctuations in the stabil-
ity of the task goal representation in the PFC affect attentional
selection processes and are therefore another major property that
determines the likelihood of committing an error. It is simply
the lack of biasing influences on attentional selection processes
that further contributes to the likelihood of committing an error.
Both aspects of error commissioning, i.e., the stability of the
task goal representation and attentional selection processes, are
interrelated determinants of error commissioning.
Convergent input to the basal ganglia and the “winner-take-all
principle”
However, functioning of the prefrontal cortex cannot be under-
stood without referring to the basal ganglia, as these structures are
well known to from closed functional loops (e.g., Chudasama and
Robbins, 2006). Moreover, when considering the possible impor-
tance of the dopamine system for fluctuations in error likelihood
and hence mechanisms of error commission, the basal ganglia
need also be taken into account. The basal ganglia are important
when considering the gating functions of the prefrontal cortex
(O’Reilly et al., 2010) that are related to shifts in the processing
modes of task goal representations in prefrontal cortical networks.
However, to fulfill this requirement, the basal ganglia must serve
as a “hub region” that receives information from the PFC and is
modulated by processes occurring in the sensory modalities. It
is well established that the PFC is closely connected to the basal
ganglia via distinct functional loops (Chudasama and Robbins,
2006). Several theoretical accounts suggest that the basal ganglia
are central to response selection mechanisms (Redgrave et al.,
1999; Gurney et al., 2001, 2004a; Humphries and Gurney, 2002;
Humphries et al., 2006; Maia and Frank, 2011). Conceptions that
stress the importance of basal ganglia structures in action selec-
tion and control propose that the selection of actions (motor
commands) depends on the relative salience of competing actions
and that the most salient competitor wins this selection process
(Redgrave et al., 1999, 2011). Action selection should be termi-
nated when it has been successful or if it proves to be ineffective
or erroneous. The selection of a correct action may also be “inter-
rupted” by a competitor that is relatively more salient than the
desired action (Redgrave et al., 1999) because action selection at
the level of the basal ganglia is described by a “winner-take-all”
(WTA) mechanism (Kropotov and Etlinger, 1999; Redgrave et al.,
1999; Plenz, 2003). Following selection, the winning outcome
may begin to reduce the salience of its predisposing conditions (as
these become partially fulfilled). When the salience of a selected
action falls below that of a close competitor, this competitive
action will be executed (Redgrave et al., 1999). This WTA mecha-
nism that mediates the selection of actions is implemented using
a neural network that converges to a single winner (Bar-Gad et al.,
2003). In biologically constrained computational models (Gurney
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et al., 2004b), these mechanisms are modeled as the action of
striatal medium spiny neurons (MSNs). The MSNs are strongly
modulated by the dopaminergic system via dopamine D1 and
D2 receptors (overview: Surmeier et al., 2010). The dense net-
work of inhibitory connections between MSNs is assumed to
inhibit neighboring neurons and thereby maintain the activity of
only a single neuron. The selection process takes place within the
striatum, and the chosen action is then conveyed to the output
layer of the basal ganglia and subsequently fed back to the cor-
tex where the selected response is executed (Bar-Gad et al., 2003).
Because bias signals affect response execution processes (Miller
and Cohen, 2001), it is reasonable to assume that representations
or contextual inputs may influence basal ganglia processes and,
hence, WTA (for a review see: Samejima et al., 2005; Redgrave
and Gurney, 2006). This assumption is even more likely because
the functioning of prefrontal cortical areas cannot be understood
in isolation from the modulatory influences of the basal gan-
glia (Parvizi, 2009). The ultimate effect of these bias signals is
the re-weighting of the relative influences of goal-directed and
error-favoring representations in the basal ganglia. The basal gan-
glia WTA network “decides” in favor of the activation with the
strongest representation. In turn, the basal ganglia WTA mecha-
nism most likely selects another (possibly correct) action simply
because the relative weights favor that action. This re-weighting
of task representations at the level of the basal ganglia may be
attributable to one or both of the following processes:
(i) the correct task representation is strengthened in the
prefrontal cortical networks;
(ii) the sensitivity of the neural structures of the error-favoring
information is reduced.
The above-mentioned (“re”)-strengthening of task representa-
tions in the PFC by dopaminergic influx (Miller, 2000) is nec-
essary because the error may partly have occurred due to weaker
task-goal representations, which might ultimately lead to a dis-
advantageous pattern of activations in the basal ganglia that may
foster the occurrence of an error, particularly when a distracting,
error-favoring sensory input is concomitantly present.
Similar to prefrontal representations, basic visual inputs enter
the basal ganglia networks (Hikosaka, 1989; Hikosaka andWurtz,
1989; Silkis, 2000; Coizet et al., 2007; Redgrave et al., 2011). A
growing body of evidence suggests that a sub-cortical structure
in the dorsal midbrain (i.e., the superior colliculus) is the most
likely source of the early visual input to dopaminergic neurons
(Redgrave and Gurney, 2006; Silkis, 2000). This subcortical path-
way has been substantiated through electrophysiological studies
in rats, cats and monkeys (Comoli et al., 2003; McHaffie et al.,
2006). Thus, several cortical structures provide convergent input
to the basal ganglia, and this input consists of (i) a set of stim-
uli, (ii) a task set that has been established in the PFC, and (iii)
a corresponding efference copy. This information basically pro-
vides the basis for action selection in striatal networks (Bar-Gad
et al., 2003; Redgrave and Gurney, 2006).
As originally conceptualized by Redgrave et al. (1999), the
idea of a WTA mechanism is also central to other computational
models of response selection in the basal ganglia. The model of
Bar-Gad et al. (2003) conceives of MSNs as central to the com-
parison of different response options and, hence, the selection
between those options. Similar assumptions have been put for-
ward in the den model of Plenz (2003) and the model of Plenz
and Kitai (1998). Moreover, other recent models (e.g., Humphries
et al., 2006) assume that the basal ganglia perform response
selection processes via a restrictive mechanism; however, these
models assume that an important property of the regulation of
action selection in the basal ganglia is the dopaminergic system.
Humphries et al. (2006) assumed that response selection and con-
trol are mediated via different dopaminergic receptor systems.
This assumption is also implemented in other models of the basal
ganglia (e.g., Maia and Frank, 2011; Wiecki and Frank, 2013) in
which the distinctions between dopaminergic subsystems include
Go- and Nogo-neuron populations. These latter models devel-
oped by Frank et al. therefore primarily address response selection
in terms of response inhibition mechanisms (Wiecki and Frank,
2013). However, the models can also be applied to two-choice
decision-making and response selection processes, which are the
focus of the model of Humphries et al. (2006). These other con-
ceptions of action selection in the basal ganglia are not at odds
with the WTA network upon which our error-commissioning
model is based because the efficiency of the WTA mechanism
is modulated by dopaminergic signaling (Gurney et al., 2004a;
Humphries et al., 2006).
Supposed roles of the BG and the PFC in error commis-
sion may be linked to drift-diffusion models (DDM). The model
developed by Frank (2005) suggests that following stimulus pre-
sentation, the medial PFC generates possible actions with differ-
ent probabilities of execution that depend on the specific stimulus
(Cavanagh et al., 2011). This notion is in line with the finding
that a correlate of response monitoring, i.e., the CRN, varies as
a function of S–R mapping (refer Box 2): the CRN and thus
PFC functions appear to be attenuated if the probability of a
certain response is reduced because, prior to response selec-
tion, a defined visual spatial stimulus position is also inhibited
(Hoffmann and Wascher, 2012). However, it can be assumed
that if there is a response conflict, the medial PFC-STN net-
work should increase the decision threshold (i.e., the boundary
separation) to enable the cortico-striatal network to assess the
reward values of the response alternatives (Cavanagh et al., 2011).
Cavanagh et al. investigated this assumption via integration of
the core ideas of the BG model of Frank (2005, 2006) and the
DDM. More specifically, they investigated whether the subthala-
mic nucleus (STN), as important basal ganglia structure receiving
input from the frontal cortex, has an inhibitory influence dur-
ing decision conflict. They found that trial-to-trial medial PFC
activity, as measured based on EEG theta power, is correlated
with the threshold for evidence accumulation. This relationship is
modulated by conflict. Besides this correlative finding they found
that deep-brain stimulation of the STN in Parkinson’s patients
strongly modulates this relationship. Further corroborating the
relevance of basal ganglia processes, are studies by Forstmann
et al. (2008, 2010). These studies show that decision processes,
modeled by DDM-like processes are strongly related to basal
ganglia processes (Forstmann et al., 2008). Importantly, activa-
tion in cortico-striatal networks and especially the subthalamic
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nucleus, considered to be important for processes of error com-
mission (refer sections above), have been shown to directly pre-
dict the modulation of decision processes at the behavioral level
in choice-response tasks (Forstmann et al., 2010). Due to the
strong interrelation of the DDM with neurobiological processes
of the basal ganglia, the DDM provides opportunities to test a
key assumption of error commission on a behavioral level, i.e.,
the modulation of error likelihood. The DDM allows a quan-
tification of the parameters that reflect inter-trial fluctuations in
decision processes. These fluctuations are captured by the vari-
ability in the drift rate (e.g., variability due to fluctuations in
attention), starting point (e.g., due to online reward or punish-
ment) and the non-decisional parameter. Apparently, there is a
close link between the DDM and the error commissioning frame-
work proposed herein; i.e. according to the framework presented,
fluctuations in error likelihood are determined by the strengths of
the representations in prefrontal networks, which are akin to the
boundary separation and starting point variabilities in the DDM.
Moreover, the mechanisms associated with attentional selection
are conceptually similar to the drift rate parameter proposed in
the DDM. Aspects of vigilance are closely related to the perceptual
processing of stimuli, which is akin to the non-decisional param-
eter and its variability. Accordingly, if these processes/structures
are manipulated, one would expect variations in the correspond-
ing DDM parameters and, hence, changes in the fluctuations in
error likelihood, as outlined at the end of this article. It should be
noted that the neurobiological mechanisms modulating fronto-
striatal networks described above are not exhaustive. There
are many other modulators affecting processing in prefrontal
networks.
Timing constraints in error-commissioning
It can be assumed that the basal ganglia and the action selection
processes mediated via these structures play an important role
when considering factors possibly important for the commission-
ing of errors. Basically, the basal ganglia can be conceptualized as
a “hub region” that receives different types of information. These
inputs influence action selection, and hence, the mechanisms of
error commissioning. It is therefore critical that the basal gan-
glia, as a “hub region,” receive all of this information in a timely
manner.
Another aspect is the stability of task-goal representations in
prefrontal structures, which is determined by dopaminergic sig-
naling via dopamine D1 and D2 receptors. A major problem in
cognitive control models is generally that the dopamine system
is considered to be too slow to support the rapid processes of
action selection that ultimately lead to erroneous responses. Thus,
Jocham and Ullsperger (2009) proposed that error monitoring
and the behavioral adaptation processes that follow an error, such
as those related to the ERN, are mediated via slower dopamine
responses after the error monitoring system has been activated
through other (faster) neurotransmitter systems.
However, it can be assumed that the stabilities of task-goal rep-
resentations are dependent on the properties of the dopaminergic
system, which have been shown to exert long latency responses
in prefrontal structures that last several seconds (e.g., Robinson
et al., 2003; Seamans and Yang, 2004; Heien et al., 2005). However,
it is not clear, whether the effects of prefrontal processes on stri-
atal processes are mediated by the dopaminergic system per se:
cortico-striatal synapses are glutamatergic in nature (e.g., Bolam
et al., 2000), and it has recently been shown that striatal states can
reliably be changed by these glutamatergic inputs and influence
action selection processes (e.g., Tomkins et al., 2014). Indeed, it
is likely that that changes in the stabilities of task-goal represen-
tations in prefrontal networks affect the striatal mechanisms of
action control via glutamatergic projections. In addition to these
“contextual” influences, “sensory” influences also modulate stri-
atal structures. As outlined above, these sensory influences likely
enter striatal structures (for a review, see Redgrave et al., 2011)
and use short-latency dopamine signals. This short-latency com-
ponent of the visual input to DA neurons derives from subcortical
visual processing regions in the superior colliculus in the mid-
brain (e.g., McHaffie et al., 2006; May et al., 2009), and it has
been shown that sensory processing in the cerebral cortex can
drive phasic responses in DA neurons (for a review, see Redgrave
et al., 2011). These findings show that dopaminergic neurons are
active prior to behavioral responses. The dopaminergic system
may thus play a role in error commissioning either at the level of
short latency dopaminergic signaling or at the level of task-goal
representations in the prefrontal cortex. However, the latter, slow
dopaminergic influences at the neocortical level, might not be the
only dominant mechanism.
Error processing
The review above describes what neuronal components are nec-
essary to consider when being interested in error commissioning.
Mechanisms of error processing or more specifically adaptation
are not addressed, because these processes have been formal-
ized in well-established models and it has been shown that the
ACC plays an important role (e.g., Holroyd and Coles, 2002). An
overview of theories on error processing can be found in Box 1.
Bush et al. (2000) distinguished the ACC regions that are
involved in “cognitive” and “emotional processing”. These authors
stated that “cognitive” processing is related to the 32′, 24c′, 24b′m,
and 24a′ subregions and, thus, to the dorsal part of the ACC
(dACC). In contrast, emotional processing is due to regions 32,
24c, 24b, 24a, and 25 and therefore to the ventral part of the ACC
(vACC). The functions of the ACC range from very basic (home-
ostatic) to more complex social-cognitive functions. In general,
one can assume that the core function of the ACC is to establish
the mobilization required to cope with cognitive and, as recently
described, emotional and social demands (Mayberg et al., 1999;
Elliott et al., 2000; Paus, 2001; Phillips et al., 2003) to achieve cog-
nitive control (Koban and Pourtois, 2014). Thus, the ACC plays
a role in the processing of tasks that require increasing cogni-
tive effort and control and the management of responses when
faced with conflicting demands (Luu et al., 2003; Fan et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the ACC is a central structure involved in deter-
mining how to act in a goal-directed manner and is central to
inhibitory control (Braver et al., 2001; Bari and Robbins, 2013),
reward responses and their modulation (Amiez et al., 2005) as
well as the top-down influence on primary sensory processes
(Crottaz-Herbette and Menon, 2006). Together, these results sug-
gest that the ACC is well suited for comparing the results of
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action selection to the task-goal representation (Bush et al., 2000).
This assumption is further supported by the connections of the
ACC with even distant regions in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), which are important for working memory func-
tions (Paus, 2001). In combination with the connections with the
motor areas, this extensive connectivity of the ACC with the lat-
eral regions of the PFC may provide the basis for an interchange
between the cognitive and motor systems (Paus, 2001) that is
necessary to perform evaluator functions and to provide infor-
mation that can be used for behavioral adaptation (Paus, 2001).
This role is stressed in recent views regarding the functions of
the ACC indicating that the diversity of the functions mediated
by the ACC can be understood in terms of a single function, i.e.,
the allocation of control based on an evaluation of the expected
value of control (Shenhav et al., 2013). In this sense, this error
signal may function as a biasing signal (Miller and Cohen, 2001)
that instructs the prefrontal networks when to maintain a given
activity state (representation) (Miller, 2000; Shenhav et al., 2013).
This error biasing signal has been demonstrated using fMRI and
EEG data (Debener et al., 2005; Hoffmann et al., 2014). The error
monitoring signal can therefore be employed to strengthen rep-
resentations in the prefrontal networks. Thus, the error signal
closes the circle and influences the processes described above that
lead to the commissioning of an error. A brief description of the
properties of the error processing signal is given in Box 2.
In this sense, the ACC may play a central role not only in the
processing of errors, but also in processes preceding erroneous
or successful response selection. A recent integrative account,
the “expected value of control (EVC)” model (Shenhav et al.,
2013) proposes that the (dorsal) ACC uses information from
the current state (i.e., information of task demands, processing
capacity etc.) and expected value of the outcomes to determine
how much cognitive control is invested in a given task (Shenhav
et al., 2013). Critically for its potential role in processes leading
to errors are findings showing that above-mentioned processes
supposed to be important elements in the processes that lead
to an error (i.e., strength of task goal representation, attentional
biases, conflict monitoring and cognitive control) are all related
to the functioning of the (dorsal) ACC: the ACC differentiates
task representations and response rules (e.g., Dixon and Christoff,
2012), specific actions and task sets (Hampton and O’Doherty,
2007; Haynes et al., 2007). For an excellent overview of the ACC’s
functions refer to Shenhav et al. (2013). In sum, there is hence
ample evidence to that the ACC is involved in processes that we
are proposing to be central for the understanding of how errors
emerge. The ACC may thus not only be seen as an element in
error processing, but also as an important entity in mechanisms
that may ultimately contribute to the occurrence of errors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK
The theoretical integration outlined above details the possible
neurophysiological mechanisms that may be crucial for the com-
mission and detection of errors and behavioral adaptation. We
suggest that error likelihood is a dynamic process that depends on
the functional and temporal properties of brain regions that influ-
ence prefrontal-basal ganglia networks. Unlike other reviews of
cognitive control and error processing, the review presented here
describes the possible mechanisms that lead to the commission
of an error and the identities of the functional neuroanatomical
and neurobiological systems that may play roles in this process.
Importantly, it is proposed that error likelihood is not stable
but fluctuates over time. The “rhythm” of fluctuation is most
likely determined by different neurobiological properties of the
outlined factors within each of the considered neuro-functional
systems that must be taken into account. Thus, a major challenge
for future research will be the identification of the neurobiological
factors (and their interactions) that determine the functional and
temporal properties of the brain regions that ultimately modulate
the likelihood of response errors over time. This will be a nec-
essary requirement before formal computational models of error
commissioning can be set up, because otherwise too many factors
might be modeled making possible computational approaches
too complex and thus quite difficult to be empirically validated.
Several starting points are available for the initiation of an inves-
tigation of the determinants of fluctuations in error likelihood
and hence the neural mechanisms underlying error commis-
sioning. However, it is necessary to use behavioral parameters
and psychological frameworks that allow the characterisation of
response selection processes to pursue the dynamics of error like-
lihood from a neuroscientific perspective. In this regard, it will
be necessary to include components of drift diffusion models
(DDMs; Ratcliff, 1978, 2006; Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx,
2007; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).
STARTING POINT 1
As outlined in the above sections, a major component deter-
mining error likelihood is the stability of the task goal repre-
sentations in the prefrontal cortex, which are largely determined
by dopaminergic neural transmission via different receptors.
The stability of task goal representations may bias subsequent
processing of incoming information. The strength of task goal
information may therefore have also an influence on how much
information is needed to reach a (correct or erroneous) deci-
sion. When referring to the DDM this is reflected in the “starting
point” parameter (z). The starting point (z) describes the a priori
bias associated with one of the choices. Pharmacological stud-
ies in humans and animals may specifically target dopamine D1
and D2 receptor neural transmission to modulate fluctuations
in error likelihood. Similarly, molecular genetic studies examin-
ing the relevance of different single nucleotide polymorphisms
that affect dopaminergic neural transmission will be of interest.
However, the use of pharmacological approaches will enable the
determination of dose-response functions that efficiently modu-
late the fluctuations in error likelihood over time. It remains to
be determined whether dopamine D1 or D2 receptor-mediated
neural transmission will be more important in modulating error
likelihood. Regardless, agonistic modulation of dopaminergic D2
receptors should induce stronger fluctuations in error likelihood
than agonistic modulations of the D1 receptor system because
the task goal representations that guide response selection are
less stable. However, regarding the relevance of the prefrontal
dopaminergic system, it will be of great interest to examine psy-
chiatric and neurological diseases that affect the dopaminergic
system, such as schizophrenia and Parkinson’s disease. Several
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lines of research suggest that the processing of errors is altered
in these diseases. Research on fluctuations in error likelihood will
broaden this perspective in such a manner that different diseases
that affect the dopaminergic systems may be viewed not only as
“error-processing disorders” but also as disorders of the processes
that lead to errors. By modulating the dopaminergic system and
thereby a parameter that may affect task goal representations, it is
possible that parameter (z) of the DDM is modulated.
Notwithstanding the relevance of the dopaminergic system as
a starting point for investigations of fluctuations in error likeli-
hood, the striatal GABAergic medium spiny neuron system is also
relevant. One option for investigating this functional relevance
may be targeted pharmacological manipulation of the striatal
GABAergic system using muscimol in animal experiments. In
humans, another option may be to investigate diseases that affect
the functioning of striatal medium spiny neurons in combination
with dopaminergic dysfunctions. One possible way to complete
the link to the relevance of the dopaminergic system together
with structural basal ganglia changes is investigation of neurode-
generative diseases such as Parkinson’s or Huntington’s disease.
However, the examination of rare disease models that lack dys-
functions of the dopaminergic system but exhibit circumscribed
dysfunctions of basal ganglia structures may enable confounds
due to alterations of the dopaminergic system and changes in
the structural basal ganglia to be avoided. For example, benign
hereditary chorea (BHC) may be used as a model disease (e.g.,
Beste and Saft, 2013, 2014). Additionally, advances in GABAergic
magnetic resonance spectroscopy related to the neurobiochemical
properties of striatal structures and cognitive control functions
(e.g., Yildiz et al., 2014) and, hence, the fluctuation in error like-
lihood may also be of relevance from a systems perspective and
for examination of the striatal GABAergic system. As regards the
potential role of the GABAergic system in processes leading to
an error and with respect to the DDM it is possible that the
GABAergic may affect both, the parameter (z) and the drift rate.
The latter describes how much information is needed for a deci-
sion. This dual role of the GABAergic system for parameters (z)
and the drift is plausible since the GABAergic is central to the
comparison of different response options. This comparison pro-
cess needs information, whose accumulation is reflected in the
drift rate. On the other hand the GABAergic system is assumed to
play a role in the maintenance of task goal. There the GABAergic
system may also affect parameter (z) in the DDM.
STARTING POINT 2
In addition to these neurobiochemical and disease approaches for
examining the functional neuroanatomical constraints on fluc-
tuations in error likelihood, another important starting point
will be the manipulation of information processing at the cor-
tical level within in the prefrontal cortex and sensory processing
areas. Such manipulations are important because error likelihood
may be at least partially determined by competitive attentional
selection processes. Perturbing information processing in these
structures using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or per-
ceptual learningmechanisms (Beste et al., 2011b; Beste andDinse,
2013) will help to elucidate the relevance of these functional
neuroanatomical structures in the dynamics of error commis-
sioning. Using such an approach it should be possible to elucidate
the relative contribution of different parameters of the DDM
in close relation to circumscribed functional neuroanatomical
regions. As outlined in the previous section, processes from the
perceptual level to the level of task-goal representations may
be important in the cascade of error commission. It is possi-
ble that by targeting sensory processing (areas), the drift rate as
indicator of the speed of information accumulation is affected.
Perturbing information processing in prefrontal structures may,
on the other hand, be more relevant to the modulation of the
boundary separation parameter (a) and starting point (z), as
these parameters are both reflecting aspects/consequences of task
goals.
Clearly, the above-mentioned exemplary approaches (starting
points) initially have to be applied with a focus on specific com-
ponents of the described error-commissioning network. Each of
these components contributes to the fluctuation in error likeli-
hood, and the contribution of each component to the fluctuation
in error likelihood may be described as a function of time in
mathematical terms. As in the excerpts described above, it might
be possible to derive neurobiologically constrained “functions”
that describe the dynamics of cognitive processing in different
brain regions and cognitive systems using targeted approaches.
Hence the individual contributions of these processes to the fluc-
tuation in error likelihood can be described. It remains to be
determined which and how many of these functions will be
found to be important for description of the fluctuation in error
likelihood over time. However, as error commissioning and the
fluctuation in error likelihood are conceptualized as a the inter-
play of different functional neurobiological and neuroanatomical
systems, a coherent view of the determinants of error commis-
sioning will require approaches that examine previously iden-
tified functions that simultaneously determine fluctuations in
error likelihood. Mathematically speaking, error likelihood may
be described as the folding of each of these contributing “sub-
functions” that partially determine the fluctuations in error like-
lihood. However, it remains to be seen how much variance in
the fluctuations in error likelihood will be explained by each of
these functions. Using approaches that examine the influences of
various factors that simultaneously determine the fluctuations in
error likelihood, it will be possible to determine which aspects
contribute most strongly to the fluctuations in error likelihood.
Using a combined approach, it will, in the long term, be possible
to examine how many aspects of information processing need to
be monitored to predict the occurrence of an error to a reasonable
degree. This investigation is tantamount to the question of which
neurobiological components are most important for the fluctu-
ations in error likelihood. Most likely, the different components
need to be weighted according to their relative importance in
determining the fluctuation in error likelihood, and this relative
importance may be further subject to inter-individual differences
that are grounded in inter-individual variations in the neurobio-
logical factors that determine the processing of cognitive systems
that are important for error commissioning and the fluctuation
of error likelihood.
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